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In the spring of 2012 Vladimir Putin was elected as the President of Russia for the third 
time. With his return as the head of the state, new conservative discourse, with normative 
dimension, started to emerge in the Russian politics. Cases of the Pussy Riot, the gay 
propaganda law or anti-blasphemy law, are examples of this conservative turn. This 
discourse also implies portrayal of the West as deviant and perverted, while Russia stands 
as the last bastion in defense of traditional values. Such articulation is widely supported and 
enhanced by the Russian Orthodox Church. As it will be argued in the present study, this 
discourse serves not only domestic political purposes, but also provides important bases for 
the Russian normative hegemony to be projected outwards. Hegemony will be defined from 
the Neo-Gramscian understanding and it will be illustrated how the civil society institutions 
inside Georgia help to articulate, project and maintain the Russian discourse to the 
Georgian society and subsequently counter an alternative, the Western discourse, expressed 
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 With Vladimir Putin being elected as the president of the Russian Federation for the 
third time in 2012, new discourse started to appear in the Russian politics. Aim of new, 
more conservative approach was to further legitimatize his power and project influence 
outside its borders. As it will be illustrated in the present study, in the major speeches 
delivered by the President normative dimension started to appear. The discourse of the need 
of the “defense of traditional values,” “traditional families” from the attack of “Godless” 
and “perverted West” has started to occupy a considerable part in the speeches delivered by 
the heads of the Russian political elite.  
 Study of this normative discourse is especially important nowadays, since the 
signature of the Association Agreement (AA) with the EU by Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine, further illustrated challenges, societies in those countries face and how the 
Russian normative hegemony can dwell on these developments. As it will be argued in the 
following study, articulation and projection of this discourse domestically or abroad is 
supported and maintained by the institutions of the civil society, key of which is the 
Russian Orthodox Church.  
As a theoretical framework, to define hegemony and its projection, Critical theory 
and more concretely Neo-Gramscian approach will be referred. Neo-Gramscian approach 
to hegemony differs from the classical understanding that is suggested by the traditional 
theories of the International Relations. Unlike them, Neo-Gramscianism shifts emphasis 
from the material and military capabilities to the articulation and justification of the 
particular set of interests as general interests. It appears in the general acceptance of ideas 
without the threats or the use of force, and is supported by material resources and 
institutions created by the dominant social class. Despite this domination being within the 
scope of the concrete state, it starts growing outwards and is projected on a world scale.  
The Western normative hegemony, would also be defined in Neo-Grmascian terms, 
but unlike the one, articulated by the Kremlin, it is expressed in the reforms the AA 
requires from the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries. The case of Georgia will be 
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discussed to show how the political elite in Georgia tries to stay within the Western 
normative discourse by supporting minority rights and their protection, while the society 
still struggles to accept those values and feels associated with the Russian discourse. The 
projection of which, is supported by the civil society institutions, mostly the Georgian 
Orthodox Church.  
The following research questions will be addressed within the scope of this study: 
How is normative discourse articulated by the Russian political elite and projected 
domestically? What are the effects of the Russian political discourse against the hegemony 
of the western value systems in the societies of the EaP countries? (Case of Georgia). What 
is the role of the civil society, in particular the Russian Orthodox Church, the Georgian 
Orthodox Church and NGOs associated with them, within this discourse? 
 The main task of the research is to describe current political discourse among the 
Russian political elite and analyze its possible effects on the societies in the EaP countries, 
with a focus on Georgia. Georgia is getting closer to the EU and the society is split or torn 
between two value systems. Mostly qualitative research will be conducted, with the focus 
on the discourse analysis of the speeches and interviews of the president of the Russian 
Federation. Recent opinion poll results will be analyzed as well, in order to have a picture 
of how society itself feels about certain value systems, the Russian political elite is trying to 
build and how successful it might be on the way to becoming a counter-hegemonic 
ideology from the neo-gramscian perspective.  
The outcome of the research will be one more important contribution to the 
approach which has not been studied that much. It can serve as the basis for further 
researches on the issues such as Russian soft power, cultural hegemony or the influence of 






Theoretical framework  
Neo-Gramscian concept of hegemony  
“Theory is always for someone and for some purpose” (Cox, 1981, p. 128) – says 
Cox. According to him, every theory has a certain perspective which derives from the 
position in time and space, specifically political time and space. Therefore, there can be no 
theory in itself detached from the context. It should be studied as an ideology to “lay bare 
its concealed perspective” (Cox, 1981, p.128). If reality, theory is trying to comprehend, is 
changing, old concepts have to be adjusted, rejected or if necessary new concepts to be 
elaborated within the new reality.  
 Based on what has been argued above, Cox suggests division of theories as problem 
solving and critical. Former, claims to be a guide in order to solve problems within the 
particular perspective that was taken as a point of departure. In contrast, critical theory 
focuses on the process of theorizing itself. It also tries to open up the possibility of 
choosing different perspective from where an alternative world can be developed. If 
problem solving theories take world as it finds together with its institutions and social and 
power relations as the given framework for action, critical theory tries to analyze how this 
whole world order itself came about. Cox  points out that meanwhile general aim of the so 
called problem solving theories is to make this prevailing world order function and works 
smoothly, critical theory can be characterized as a guide to “strategic action for bringing 
about an alternative order” (Cox, 1981,  p. 131). 
 Despite both, critical and problem solving theories take a particular sphere of 
human activity as a point of departure, unlike the latter, which leads to the subdivision and 
limitation on the issue, the former seeks to give a larger picture. It tries to uncover the 
processes which involve both, the whole and the part. But what is most important, Cox also 
gives an answer to the question why Neo-Gramscian approach is most suitable for the 
following study of the Russian politics on the global or domestic scale. As he writes, 
according to the situations in different periods of history, one, from these two kinds of 
theories, gets preferred. For instance, during the cold war, which was a relatively stable 
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period, problem solving approach was more popular, since the aim of the theory was to 
solve problems connected with the management of power relations between enduring two 
superpowers. While unstable historical period, usually favors critical theory as it seeks to 
understand “opportunities and risks of change” (Cox, 1981, p. 131).  
 Within the scope of this study, division of Marxism suggested by Cox should be 
further discussed. According to him, we can speak of two types of Marxism which are 
historical materialism and structural Marxism. While the latter is mostly preoccupied with 
the study of the capitalist state and society as static concepts, departing from historical 
analysis, historical materialism seeks to explain and promote changes in social relations. 
This type of approach is associated with the writings of Hobsbawm or Gramsci. Historical 
materialism, which itself is the main source of the critical theory, according to Cox, 
challenges neo-realism in four aspects. Firstly, with dialectics at the level of logic and at the 
level of real history. It means that it seeks truth through exploring contradictions. At the 
same time, potential for development of the alternative order through the clashes between 
opposing social forces. Secondly, because it focuses on imperialism, historical materialism 
adds a vertical dimension of power to the horizontal dimension of competing powerful 
states. Thirdly, historical materialism adds the perspective of state/civil society complexes. 
Relationship between structure which is economic and super-structure or ethico-political 
sphere, presents potential for speaking of those complexes as constituent parts of a world 
order. Finally, unlike neo-realism, historical materialism focuses on the production process, 
which is the key element of the particular historical form taken by state/society complexes. 
(Cox, 1981, pp. 133-135).  
 As the result, Cox formulates five basic premises for critical theory. Those are:  
1. Awareness that every action takes place within the framework of action.  
2. The realization that not only acts but even theory is not free and is affected by 
this problem.  
3. The main goal of the critical theory is to understand the changes of the 
framework of actions which happens over time.  
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4.  The framework has form of historical structure which can be described as a 
combination of ideas, material capabilities and institutions.  
5. In terms of reproduction or conflicts which open possibility for change of the 
structure, should be viewed from the bottom, rather than from the top.  (Cox, 
1981, p. 135). 
Robinson in his article, “Gramsci and Globalization: From Nation-State to 
Transnational Hegemony” introduces four different concepts of hegemony. First is 
hegemony as international domination, it is connected with the realist school of IR. It is 
understood as dominance backed up by the active domination. Second concept is hegemony 
as encountered in various world-systems approaches in International Relations. It can be 
characterized as the dominance of one concrete nation-state by imposing rules to allow it to 
function. Third, understanding of hegemony suggested by Robinson is ideological 
hegemony. This concept is associated with Italian thinker Antonio Gramsci and his works. 
It is understood as the mean by which ruling class establishes and maintains its domination. 
“Hegemony is rule by consent, or the cultural and intellectual leadership achieved by a 
particular class, class fraction, stratum or social group, as part of a larger project of class 
rule or domination” (Robinson, 2005, p. 560). In the last concept of hegemony offered by 
Robinson it is understood as the leadership within the concrete historical bloc within a 
particular world order. It combines some elements of state power with the construction of 
ideological leadership within the particular historical project (Robinson, 2005, p. 560). 
 These last two concepts described above are important for current study and within 
the scope of this research they will be further elaborated and discussed. Especially, works 
of Ernesto Laclau will be referred, who took this concept even further by departing from 
the domination understood from the class division perspective.  
 Another important author, who contributed to the development of the Neo-
Gramscian approach, is Rupert. His work, “Producing Hegemony: State/Society Relations 
and the Politics of Productivity in the United States” is still considered to be one of the 
most sophisticated analyses of the U.S hegemony from this perspective. The approach 
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suggested by Rupert offers relational understanding of the state which differs from abstract 
and ahistorical concept elaborated by such theories as Neorealism or Wallerstein’s critical 
political economy are. From this perspective, the historical construction of the state and the 
context within which it took place becomes the central focus of analysis. It departs from 
seeing the political state as empirical data, it rather tries to study or research those 
underlying social processes that led to the institutionalization of such form of organization 
as a state is. “States, state powers, and the social relations in which they are embedded are 
thus viewed as socially produced and historically mutable.” – writes Rupert (Rupert, 1990, 
p. 431). The power from this perspective is understood as a capacity for social action in a 
historically specific structural context. Thus, once power is conceptualized as the process, 
Cox adopts the Antonio Gramsci’s notion of hegemony to the International Relations and it 
is defined as the domination maintained by consent while coercive elements become 
secondary (Cox, 1987, pp. 151-210). Domination itself is understood as “an asymmetrical 
capacity to shape this historical-structural site of social action and ought not to be conflated 
with the inventories of material resources wielded by individuals or state” (Rupert, 1990, p. 
432). The main focus of the study of the hegemonic power thus becomes those socially 
constructed everyday practices in which people engage. It includes economic, as well as 
political and ideological aspects.  
Another important aspect, why Neo-Gramscian approach of critical theory is 
important for this study is the fact that conventional International Relations theories make a 
distinction between civil society and state. This could be logical if were applied to the 
Europe of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, when state on the one hand was 
occupied with the maintenance of  the internal peace and defense, while society consisted 
of individuals interacting with each other according to market-based relations. Within this 
distinction, foreign policy was attributed purely to the state interests. But today, according 
to Cox, the state and civil society are “so interpenetrated, that the concepts have become 
almost purely analytical… and are only very vaguely and imprecise indicative of distinct 
spheres of activity” (Cox, 1981, p. 127). 
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One of the main authors whose definition of hegemony will be used in the 
following study to demonstrate how the Russian normative discourse is articulated is 
Ernesto Laclau. He picks up on the classical Marxist division of structure/superstructure 
and criticizes it, by claiming that there is no objective reality. Reality itself, as such, is 
mediated and produced through discourses. (Laclau, Mouffe, 1985). Laclau defines 
hegemony as an articulation, which itself is the practice of “establishing a relation among 
elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice” (Laclau, 
Mouffe, 1985, p.105). As the result of this articulation, structured totality is received, which 
Laclau characterizes as discourse. He departs from Gramsci in understanding of hegemony 
and goes beyond in two key aspects. Firstly, by rejecting the idea that hegemonic subjects 
are limited to classes. As Laclau argues, in modern times when “the reproduction of the 
different social areas takes place in permanently changing conditions which constantly 
require the construction of new systems of differences” (Laclau, Mouffe, 1985, p. 138) area 
of articulatory practices has become incredibly wide. Secondly, Laclau discards the 
assumption that every social formation structures itself around one hegemonic discourse.  
As he argues, hegemony is “political type of relation, a form, if one so wishes, of politics, 
but not a determinable location within a topography of the social” (Laclau, Moufee, 1985, 
p.139). Or in other words, in any given social formation, large variety of “hegemonic nodal 
points” can be found.  
 
Moment of hegemony 
 In the writings of Gramsci, we encounter concept of the integral state developed by 
him. This idea stands in contrast to the liberal understanding of the separation of power. 
Especially, in contrast to the notion of the state apparatus being outside the involvement in 
the economy. Gramsci rather saw the state as a historically determined combination which 
embodies different cultures bound together by coercion and moral consent. Therefore, it 
was seen as a substitute for private-enterprise in the economy by manufacturing it through 
the privileges and protectionism. Even such concept as lassiez-faire was understood by 
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Gramsci as another state regulation, supported and maintained by legislative or coercive 
means (Morton, 2007). Based on his works, state can be characterized as a social relation, 
rather than distinct institutional category or thing in itself. Following formula can be 
formulated, describing definition of the state for the Gramscian perspective: State = 
political society + civil society, or in other words, “hegemony protected by the armor of 
coercion” (Gramsci, 1971, as cited in Morton, 2007, p. 120). This combination of the civil 
and political society is what Gramsci refers to in his works as an integral state and through 
which ruling class organizes intellectual and moral sides of the struggle for hegemony. 
 This concept of the integral state is important for further understanding of the idea 
of the moment of hegemony. As Gramsci argued, intellectuals play major role in forming 
and maintaining current hegemony or forming counter-hegemonic consciousness (Gramsci, 
1971, 1999). Therefore, such material resources as publishing houses, educational 
institutions or even street names can be seen as the elements of the struggle over hegemony, 
which is transmitted through the so called capillary power. Therefore the moment of 
hegemony can be defined as something that involves “both the consensual diffusion of a 
particular cultural and moral view throughout society and its interconnection with coercive 
functions of power; or when there is a corresponding equilibrium between ethico-political 
ideas and prevailing socioeconomic conditions fortified by coercion” (Morton, 2007, p. 95) 
 Gramsci also introduces the concept of historical bloc. It can be seen as the 
combination of classical Marxist structure/superstructure elements. But Italian scholar, 
according to Morton, was innovative by suggesting the idea that once an economic 
structure reaches its limits or becomes regressive, it’s still maintained, because it is 
supported by respective ideology. It is also understood by Gramsci as concrete relations of 
social forces or in other words, historical bloc integrates variety of different class interests. 
Therefore, successful and fully developed historical bloc can only be formed, once 
hegemony has been achieved by the concrete social group over the state-civil society 




Hegemony and world order 
 Neo-Gramscian approach to hegemony differs from the classical understanding that 
can be observed in the traditional theories of the International Relations. Unlike the latter, 
former shifts emphasis from material and military capabilities to the articulation and 
justification of the particular set of interests as general interests. It appears in the general 
acceptance of ideas, which are supported by material resources and institutions created by 
the dominant social class. Despite this domination is within the scope of the concrete state, 
it starts growing outwards and is projected on a world scale. Therefore, within the world 
order, hegemony will appear as a “configuration of material power, the prevalent collective 
image of world order (including certain norms) and set of institutions which administer 
order with a certain semblance of universality” (Cox, 1981, p. 139, as cited in Morton, 
2007,  p. 113). It can be concluded that the existence of the powerful state can be necessary 
but not sufficient for the articulation of hegemony. Therefore, if it is perceived as 
something connected with the images and opinions rather than just brute force and 
economic capabilities, it is important to study such issues as how the hegemonic world 
order is based on values and understandings are. Hence it should be analyzed how 
intersubjective meanings can form an understanding of reality. ““Reality” is not only the 
physical environment of human action but also the institutional, moral and ideological 
context that shapes thoughts and actions” (Cox, 1997, p. 252, as cited in Morton, 2007, p. 
114). Hegemony touches such topics as gender, ideology, culture, etc. Are, dimensions 
which stay outside the traditional IR theories, for which hegemony is understood in the 
context of the state dominance.  
 According to Morton, hegemony within the historical structure rests on three 
spheres of activity. These are: a) the social relations of production, which doesn’t only 
include actual manufacturing process in economic terms, but also encompasses institutional 
and discursive forms of production. b) Forms of state, which consists of state-civil society 
complexes and c) World orders, which not only represents the current phase of stability and 
conflict, but also indicates how alternative world orders could emerge (Morton, 2007). For 
a better illustration of this structure we can refer to the figure from Robert Cox’s article, 
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Social Forces, States and World Orders published in 1981 (Cox, 1981, p. 138). It should 
also be noted, that those three spheres of activity are interrelated which means that changes 
into the social relations of production affects forms of states which also brings changes in 
the existing world order. 








(Cox, 1981, p. 138). 
It should also be noted that there is no unilinear relationship between spheres of 
activity, therefore the point of departure for explaining the historical process doesn’t 
necessarily have to be social relations of production, it can be forms of state as well as 
world order.  Morton farther introduces three additional elements which within each main 
sphere of activity constitute the historical structure.  Those elements are ideas which can be 
described as intersubjective meanings and collective image of the world order; material 
capabilities and institutions (Morton, 2007). To get better illustration, Cox once again can 













         (Cox, 1981, p. 136). 
 
Historical structure or framework of action represents a particular combination of 
forces. But this configuration shouldn’t be understood as the direct determinant of actions, 
but rather as imposer of constraints and pressures. Individuals or groups, according to Cox, 
may move along with the pressure or may oppose it, but they cannot ignore it. If they are 
successful in resistance, then it can be used as a basis for an alternative configuration of 
forces, which might emerge as an alternative structure.  
As a result a framework can be seen, how changes in the modes of the relations of 
social production can lead to the emergence of the certain social class in power. These 
social forces themselves can become the bases of power in the form of the state, while the 
state itself might shape world order. It follows, that hegemony should not be understood as 
a hierarchy of states. It’s rather the rule of the certain social class. But class identity itself 
emerges through the struggle and economic exploitation within the particular historical 
context. It should also be noted, that focus on the exploitation cannot be reduced to the pure 
material aspects. It also includes other identities as well, such as national, ethnic, religious, 
gender or sexual, for instance, are. They are not set aside, but rather such “non-class” issues 
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are defined in terms of the social realties shaped by the production process. From what has 
been argued above, state can be characterized as a social relation, rather than a thing in 
itself. Following formula can be formulated, describing definition of the state from the 
Gramscian perspective: State = political society + civil society, or in other words, 
“hegemony protected by the armor of coercion” (Gramsci, 1971, as cited in Morton, 2007, 
p.120). Civil society in this equation, can be defined as an internalized form of domination, 
which is different from the direct domination achieved by the political society through the 
direct use of force. Therefore, civil society becomes a space, within which state maintains 
its hegemony, “in which one concept of reality is dominant informing with its spirit all 
modes of thoughts and behavior” (Femia, 1981, p.24). According to Buttigieg, Gramsci’s 
civil society “is best described not as the sphere of freedom but of hegemony” (Buttigieg, 
1995, p.6). Consent, which is the main tool of normative hegemony, is manufactured within 
the civil society. It is present in various forms of social interaction and in this way elite 
leads the society in a certain direction. Those social institutions, hegemony operates 
through, are Church, the educational institutions, press etc. From this perspective will be 
civil society understood within the scope of this study, and as it will be argued in the 
second part, these civil society institutions help to create certain modes of behavior within 
the hegemonic social order and with the creation of expectations, play a key role in 
projecting and maintaining hegemony.  
According to Morton, “struggle for hegemony involves translating particular 
interests from a particular form of state into the forms of expansion that have universal 
applicability across a variety of different states” (Morton, 2007, p. 123). Usually it is within 








Data Analysis  
As the specifics of the topic and the theory selected, which is Russia and the West: 
Struggle for Normative Hegemony, requires, following study will rely on qualitative 
methods of research. This is especially the case of discourse analysis.  
Discourse analysis can be defined as the practice of analyzing “empirical raw 
materials and information as discursive forms” (Howarth, Norval, Stravrakakis, 2000, p. 4). 
It means that from this perspective, as a text can be understood such large variety of data as 
speeches, interviews, policies and even institutions and organizations are.  
It is an interesting peculiarity of the discourse analysis that instead of applying pre-
existing theoretical frameworks on the set of empirical data, it tries to articulate a particular 
concept for each individual case. Therefore, theoretical framework should be flexible 
enough to be easily transformed, adjusted and even deformed as the research progresses. It 
will be conducted on the macro level as the aim of the research is to analyze how concrete 
texts, which include speeches, institutions, and organizations, reflect upon the perceptions 
of the society.  
There are many various types of discourse analysis, but for the following study, 
discourse theory associated with works of Laclau will be employed (Laclau, Mouffe, 1985). 
His theory reflects upon the concept of hegemony developed by Antonio Gramsci and 
therefore can be useful within the scope of this particular research.  
Discourse theory picks up on Marxism and starts criticizing the classical division of 
structure being economic and means of production and superstructure as the other meaning-
producing institutions, such as political or educational organizations. Laclau and Mouffe try 
to discard such approach by claiming that there is no objective reality that can divide 
people into classes (Lalclau, Mouffe, 1985). It is more of a result of political discourse, or 
processes that produce this “reality.” It means that our understanding of reality itself is 
mediated and produced through discourses (Rear, 2013, p. 4). 
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As a result, it can be argued that the aim of discourse analysis is to describe those 
discursive struggles that construct reality in a way that it appears natural and neutral (Rear, 
2013, p. 5).  
One of the key analytical concepts that will be borrowed from Laclau and applied to 
this particular research is the notion of nodal points. It can be described as the departing or 
reference point around which discourse starts to organize. It creates the system which gives 
meanings to other concepts that might be differently defined within the alternative 
discourses. As an example of such nodal point, David Rear gives communism, which 
completely changes the meaning of democracy or freedom articulated in the alternative 
discourse (Rear, 2013, p. 7). This process itself, process of other notions acquiring 
meanings by being projected to the nodal points, happens through articulation, which is the 
practice of establishing “a relations among elements which such that their identity is 
modified” (Laclau, Mouffe, 1985, p.105). The nodal points of the present study are 
Orthodox Christianity and traditional values, since, as it will be illustrated below, meanings 
of democracy, freedom of expression or human rights, changes, once are applied to those 
nodal points in the discourse of the Russian political elite.  
This understanding of discourse theory touches upon the topic of hegemony from 
Neo-Gramscian perspective, which is of particular importance for following research. As 
the Italian thinker defined hegemony, it is something that achieves desired results without 
the use of material force, or to say it with the discourse analysis terms, it is obtained and 
maintained through articulation (Gramsci, 1971, 1999). It is the “expansion of a discourse, 
or set of discourses, into a dominant horizon of social orientation and action by means of 
articulating unfixed elements into partially fixed moments in a context crisscrossed by 
antagonistic forces” (Torfing, 1999, p. 101 as cited in Rear, pp. 7-8). But it is also 
important to note that the notion of hegemony from discourse theory perspective is 
perceived not only at the class level but at other levels of social relations. It gives another 
big advantage to applying discourse analysis for the following study, since it touches upon 
such issues as religion, traditional values and political organizations are, rather than class 
understood in economic relations’ terms.  
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 Another method which will be applied within the scope of this study is an 
interpretation of already existing quantitative data. Data available from the Caucasus 
Barometer, which is a survey conducted every year in the countries of South Caucasus 
about political attitudes and economic issues.  
     Data Sampling  
 When it comes to data selection and sampling it is important for the following study 
to look at speeches and interviews made by representatives of the Russian political elite. 
Therefore the main focus during the data selection process is on the President Vladimir 
Putin. Due to the limitation of study, it is impossible to cover everything. Therefore, it 
would more rational to analyze major speeches delivered by president Putin such as annual 
address to Federal Assembly are. It is also vital for providing a better picture of discourse 
articulated by the Russian political elite to look at comments and statements made by him 
in response to such cases, as Pussy Riot, anti-gay propaganda law, blasphemy banning law. 
The period, from which those speeches will be selected, is starting from 2012, since he was 
elected as the President for the third time in this year and as it will be illustrated below, it 
can also be considered to be decisive turn into more conservative discourse in the Russian 
politics.  
 Besides the President, discourse analysis of Russian Patriarch’s speeches and 
interviews should be conducted as well, since, it will be argued in the following study, the 
Russian Orthodox Church is a vital institution in articulating and maintaining hegemony 
understood in Neo-Gramscian terms. The same selection method will be applied as in the 
case above - major addresses and those statements which reflect on the Russia Vs West 
discourse - will be covered. Timeline starting from the year 2012. 
 In case of data selection and sampling for Georgia. It’s very specific. Since there are 
no official diplomatic relations between two countries due to the legacy of the August War, 
politicians in Tbilisi try to avoid the portrayal of Russia in a positive way, or in a way that 
would let an observer speak of Georgian political elite being attracted by the world order 
articulated in the Kremlin. Therefore, attention should be shifted to those institutions and 
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organizations that are influential and popular among members of the society and at the 
same time reflect to these value systems projected by Russia.  
 One of the main institutions to be analyzed from this perspective will be the 
Georgian Orthodox Church. It is closely associated with Russia and most of the speeches 
and interviews of high hierarchs, which will be analyzed within the scope of this study, will 
illustrate this connection and reflection on this discourse articulated in the Kremlin. At the 
same time, since trust in the Church still remains to be extremely high, it can be assumed 
that it can be portrayed as one of those institutions which, from Neo-Gramscian 
perspective, can project and maintain ideological or normative hegemony of Russia in the 
region. Timeline for the Georgian Orthodox Church’s discourse analysis will also be from 
the year 2012. Thos specific interviews and speeches will be selected, which reflect upon 
the Russia versus the West discourse. In addition, a couple of NGOs and media publishing 
will be covered, as according to Gramsci, they are important parts for maintaining 
hegemony. Erekle II’s Society, the Eurasian Institute and Saqinform will be analyzed.  
Another important data selection process is sampling qualitative data for 
interpretation of attitudes and beliefs of the Georgian population. For this purpose, results 
of opinion polls produced by the Caucasus Barometer will be selected. Results from the 
year 2011 will be used, which shows the Georgians attitude towards homosexuality and can 
be considered as an example of how the society feels towards the traditional value 
discourse of the Russian political elite and also results from 2013, which illustrate trust in 
the Georgian Orthodox Church among the population. International Republican Institute’s 
opinion poll results from the February of 2014 will also be used, which shows the level of 







Normative Discourse in the Russian Politics 
The Russian Orthodox Church and the State  
 Due to the big number of representatives of different religious groups, Russian 
Federation is a secular state. But once, politics are closely examined in Russia, it 
immediately becomes clear to the observer that the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is in 
far more advantageous position in relation to other religious institutions and plays the vital 
role in the unification and articulation process of the Russian statehood in Putin’s Russia.  
 As Beth Admiraal writes in “Russian Nationalism and the National Reassertion of 
Russia”: “Putin has used Orthodoxy as a platform for unifying the Russian state – as 
opposed to the nation and for solidifying the Russian state position in the near abroad” 
(Admiraal, 2009, p. 205). A parallel can be drawn to Stalin’s policies during the World War 
II, when he appealed to the Orthodox Christianity and Church for ensuring popular support 
in the hard times. It served basis for the unification of society and rising up their patriotic 
consciousness. Contemporary Russian state tells to its citizens who are followers of other 
religions that it doesn’t violate freedom of faith but it would always favor and protect 
Orthodox Christianity and in particular, the Russian Orthodox Church. At the same time, it 
is important institution or a tool in the hands of Kremlin to project influence on neighboring 
Orthodox societies and construct normative hegemony on this basis. Russian state hints to 
its bordering countries that their Orthodox history and culture places them on Moscow’s 
side rather than makes them part of the Western civilization, which Russian elite finds 
perverted and dangerous to traditional values. The Russian Orthodox Church has attained a 
considerable level of influence on the state policies. It has institutionalized its cooperation 
with almost every ministry through establishing joint forums, mixed expert commissions 
and regular meetings (Curanovic, 2012, p.81).  
 Another important fact which helps Orthodoxy to be the unifying factor of the 
Russian society is that authorities at every level, from local up to federal, believe that to be 
Russian means to be Christian Orthodox. And those, who are not religious or don’t 
associate them with any particular faith but are citizens of Russia, are automatically 
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ascribed to the Russian Orthodox Church. “At many levels of government, federal, regional 
and local – we can find overwhelming evidence that religious and political leaders believe 
that the Russian people belong in the ROC” (Admiraal, 2009, p. 208). As Curanovic notes, 
respondents in Russia when asked “whether they are “Orthodox” give their answer for the 
most part thinking, “yes, I am Russian” (Curanovic, 2012, p.62).    
It also implies that being non-Orthodox might be more costly and can cause 
unnecessary obstacles to the full membership of the Russian nation, while nominal 
Orthodoxy is tolerated and more favored since it helps to the unification and the articulation 
of the normative hegemonic discourse internally. Same applies to ethnically non-Russian 
being included into this discourse. They are included into the Russian Orthodox society 
simply because they are close to it by being “non-religious, or by keeping their religion a 
private matter” (Admiraal, 2009, p. 210). 
 Putin is quoted to have said: “The strength of Russia is spirituality before 
everything else. The revival of faith is one of the foundations of Russia’s present revival” 
(Putin, 2005, as cited in Admiraal, 2009, p. 213). This quote illustrates well how the role of 
the Orthodox Christianity is articulated and projected in the process of construction of 
Russian normative hegemony. Admiraal also offers other quotes by Putin, which further 
reinforces this assumption. “Of course, in our country the church is separated from the 
state… but in the people’s souls everything is together” (Putin, 2000, as cited in Admiraal, 
p. 210).   
 Current Russian foreign minister in one of his interviews claimed that Orthodox 
Christianity is the main reason why the West has distanced itself from Russia. According to 
Sergey Lavrov, even the Soviet Union was considered by the Western states to fit within 
their system of ideas, while contemporary Russia’s return back to Orthodoxy and its 
traditional values explain her being more distanced from the West. Within the same 
interview, he also claimed that the West is trying to maintain its domination and impose its 
system of values on the rest of the world. While, the western system itself is departing from 
its roots, which are in the Christianity (Lavrov, 2014).   
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 To better illustrate how the interests of the Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox 
Church correlate, following figure from Curanovic’s book “The Religious Factor in 
Russia’s Foreign Policy” should be referred:   
 Table 3: Correlation of goals and ideas of the Kremlin and the ROC 
 
Issue                                  Kremlin                                               Russian Orthodox Church 
Post-Soviet area                “Near abroad” (the sphere of                Canonical territory (the sphere 
                                          essential interests of Russia)                 of essential interests of Russia) 
Identity                               Eurasian/Russian civilization               Orthodox civilization 
 
Political system                  “Severing democracy” (social              Orthodox democracy (social  
                                           partnership)                                         partnership) 
Global order                       Geo-political multi-polarism                Multi-polarism of civilizations  
 
Allies                                  Strategic partnership (China,               Alliance of conservative 
                                           India)                                                  civilizations(China, India, Iran) 
Mission                               Shaping new, better-balanced             Shaping a more just global  
                                           global order, overcoming the               order, halting the process of  
                                           dominance of the USA, bridging         Westernization, promoting  
                                           the gap between the West and East      interfaith dialogue  
 
        (Curanovic, 2012, p.138). 
 
Conservative Turn in Russian Politics 
There are three major points, around which this new normative discourse started to 
be articulated and the signs of a clear conservative turn in Russian politics started to appear. 
These are cases of Pussy Riot, laws banning gay propaganda and law against blasphemy. 
Each of them should be discussed in more details below.  
Pussy Riot – as Sharafutdinova writes in her essay, “The Pussy Riot affair and 
Putin’s demarche from sovereign democracy to sovereign morality,” as Putin came to 
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power for the third time he was in need of a new niche to claim and strengthen his 
authority. That’s where his image of Russia as a defender or guarantor of traditional, 
conservative values comes in. Besides domestic purposes, it opened new opportunities and 
perspectives for Russian foreign policy (Sharafutdinova, 2014, pp. 615-616). 
In February of 2012, the feminist rock, punk group staged performance in the main 
Cathedral in Moscow, Cathedral of Christ the Savior. It was directed against the 
involvement of the Russian Orthodox Church into politics and its support for Putin. 
Performance caused concerns among the conservative members of the society in Russia. 
Three members of the group were arrested and charged with hooliganism motivated by the 
religious hatred. Head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kiril called it “devil’s 
work” and said that “devils laughed at us” (As cited in The Guardian, 2012). At the same 
time, he said that its heart breaking for him to see that some people who call themselves 
Orthodox, support lenience for arrested members of the band (The Guardian, 2012).  
President Putin’s reaction to these developments is also more conservative and goes 
hand in hand with the position of the head of the Russian Orthodox Church. He is quoted to 
have said: “they got what they asked for.” “One must not erode our moral foundations and 
undermine the country. What would be left then?”  (As cited in The Guardian, 2012). 
By appealing to the moral and normative issues, Putin’s political elite was 
successful in ignoring the political message of the performance and consolidate its 
legitimacy around the normative hegemony. It is mostly achieved by dividing society into 
spoiled Muscovite minority and majority which associates itself with conservatism and 
traditional values. Putin with his speeches and addresses appeals to this “overwhelming 
majority” and employs this discourse as a tool against “insignificant minority” which 
includes his political opposition (Sharafutdinova, 2014, p. 617). This conservative 
discourse also helps the Russian government in presenting relatively liberal members of the 
society as “foreign agents” and justifying repressions against them (Morozov, 2015, p.115). 
Gay propaganda law – in the June of 2013, Russian parliament adopted changes into 
the article 5 of the federal law “about the protection children from information damaging 
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their health and development.” It also introduced some changes in the Code of the Russian 
Federation on Administrative Offenses and child protection laws. The main change was to 
add propagating nontraditional sexual orientation as a threat to minors (President of Russia, 
2013). 
As the member of the St. Petersburg’s legislature, Vitaly Milonov, who is also one 
of the authors of the law, said in the interview with The Moscow Times “this law is useful 
for everybody. … It is a declarative law that expresses what we (Russia) value and what we 
do not. Unfortunately Europe has forgotten the story of Sodom and Gomorrah” (As cited in 
The Moscow Times, 2014). 
 In the upcoming weeks of the winter Olympics in Sochi, the issue of LGBT rights 
became widely discussed in international media. President Putin, while commenting on this 
issue, supported gay propaganda law and stayed within the discourse of homosexuals being 
threat to children. "It has nothing to do with persecuting people for their non-traditional 
orientation…My personal position is that society must keep children safe" – said President 
Putin (As cited in the ABC News, 2014). 
 In the interview with BBC News in the January of 2014, Putin also spoke about gay 
propaganda law and the Russian society. Once again, he articulated discourse, portraying 
the West as deviant and perverted. He said: “Read our law carefully and pay attention to its 
name. It’s called ban on propaganda of pedophilia and homosexuality… There are 
countries, including in Europe, where they debate the possibility of legalizing pedophilia. 
Publicly discuss it, in parliaments. They can do whatever they want, but people of Russia 
have their own cultural code, their traditions” (Putin, 2014).  
This discourse is of a special interest for the following study, since the Georgian 
Orthodox Church and public figures, closely associated with it, often refer to the Russian 
example of gay propaganda law, as how Georgian legislation should protect children and 
“traditional” families. It will be discussed in more details in the second part of the research.  
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Anti-blasphemy law – third key point, around which conservative turn in the 
Russian politics seems to start articulating, is anti-blasphemy law. It was adopted together 
with the anti-gay propaganda bill and was an offspring of the developments around pussy 
riot. It implies that any blasphemy could lead from fines up to three years of imprisonment. 
It is an interesting peculiarity of the bill, that it only covers those religions that are “an 
integral part of Russia’s historical inheritance,” leaving religious minority groups outside 
(BBC, 2013). 
For a description of this apparent turn to more conservative dimension since 2012, 
Morozov borrows the term “paleoconservatism,” which he defines as a tendency to 
“politicise culture as an instrument of “civilizational struggle”” (Morozov, 2015, p.114). As 
he argues, the discourse of the Russian civilization being different and standing in contrast 
to the West actually derives from the Kremlin’s “normative dependency” on the latter. Or, 
in other words, due to the inability to come up with an alternative ideological platform, it is 
defined from a Eurocentric perspective, blaming Europe in abandoning true values, while 
Russia “kept standing as a bulwark of Christian European value” (Morozov, 2015, pp. 117-
119).  
    Russkiy Mir  
In 2007 under Vladimir Putin’s presidency, the Russkiy Mir (Russian world) 
foundation was established, the objectives of which include promotion of Russian language 
and culture around the globe, maintaining ties with diasporas and building a positive image 
of Russia abroad. Since 2009, when the Patriarch Kirill signed cooperation agreement with 
the foundation’s board, the ROC has become one of the key institutions in further 
developing and expanding the concept of Russkiy Mir or Russian world. According to 
Wawrzonek, it can be defined as “a new project integrating post-soviet space based on a 
civilizational community” (Wawrzonek, 2014, p.760). Already in 2009, on an annual 
general meeting of the foundation, Patriarch Kirill has outlined core region of the Russkiy 
mir, which, according to him consists of Ukraine, Russia and Belarus, together with two 
organic parts, Moldova and Kazakhstan (Wawrzonek, 2014, pp. 760-761). According to 
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this concept, as in this space of shared historical memory, or in “unique civlizational 
space,” new “common political institutions” are not reproduced, Orthodox Christianity 
attains special role in the integration process. Orthodoxy itself is understood not only as a 
religion, but “also as a crucial factor of Russkiy mir’s identity”  (Wawrzonek, 2014, p.761).  
More detailed discourse analysis of President Putin’s and Patriarch Kirill’s speeches 
since 2012 will give a better illustration of how this conservative, normative discourse is 
constructed and, based on the case of Georgia, what are the implications for the EaP 
countries.  
Discourse articulated by President Putin  
In his first address to the federal assembly, after being elected as a president for the 
third time in 2012, V. Putin articulated discourse around which Russian normative 
hegemony is to be constructed. In the opening part of the speech, Putin declares:  
 “In the world of the XXI century with the background of positioning economic, 
civilization, military powers, Russia should be sovereign and influential country. We 
should not only steadily develop, but keep our national and spiritual identity, shouldn’t lose 
ourselves as a nation. Be and remain to be Russia” (Putin, 2012). He continues, that as the 
result of two world wars and civil war, Russia had gone through in the twentieth century, 
“in the beginning of XXI century we have encountered with the real demographic and value 
disaster, with the real demographic and value crises. But if the nation is not able to protect 
and reproduce itself, if it is losing life goals and ideals, she doesn’t need external enemy, 
everything will collapse itself” (Putin, 2012).  He specifically speaks of traditional value 
systems being under threat in Russia and about the importance of projecting or propagating 
those values among the members of the society. “We should support institutions, which are 
carriers out traditional values, historically proved their ability to transfer them from 
generation to generation. … Unconditional value should be returned to the schools. It 
means to update the contents of education, but at the same time keeping our traditions and 
superiority…” (Putin, 2012).  
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 Within the same speech, Putin also touches the issue of democracy and human 
rights and discourse articulated by him around these topics is an interesting illustration of 
how the nodal point such as traditional values are, can affect and change understanding and 
meanings of other notions. The notion of democracy, in this case. Russian President claims: 
“For Russia there is no and cannot be any other political choice than democracy. But at the 
same time, I want to say and even underline: we share universal democratic principles, 
accepted all around the world. But Russian democracy – it is the government of the Russian 
nation with its own traditions of national self-rule, and not the realizations of standards, 
imposed on us externally.” (Putin; 2012). 
 It shows how democracy in the context of discourse articulated by the Russian 
political elite gains specific, Russian understanding. And it stands in contrast to the 
standards being “imposed” externally, or Western notion of liberal-democracy. President 
Putin also used term accepted norms and says democracy to be compliance of those norms, 
which can be understood as an attempt to introduce conservative and traditional normative 
aspects in the understanding of democracy. It will be better illustrated as the study 
progresses and offers discourse analysis of other speeches delivered by the head of the 
Russian state.  
 In the following year’s, 2013’s, address to the Federal Assembly, President Putin 
further articulated this discourse and once again projected his views about traditional values 
and conservatism.  
 “Dear colleagues! Upcoming 2014 year is declared the year of the culture in Russia. 
It is supposed to become the year of the real enlightenment, of returning to our cultural 
roots, to the issues of patriotism, norms and morals” (Putin, 2013). But at the same time, 
within the same speech, he articulates the idea that the normative power of Russia should 
be projected outwards as a guarantor of stability in the region. He claims that in the 
contemporary world, which is contradictory and dynamic, historical responsibility of 
Russia increases.  
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“Today, in many countries, norms of moral and morality are reviewed, national 
traditions and difference between nations and cultures are being erased. Society has been 
asked today, not only healthy recognition of each person’s right of freedom of conscience, 
political views and private life, but also necessary recognition of, strange it might sound, 
equality of good and bad, which are contradictory notions. This kind of demolition of 
traditional values form “above” not only implies negative consequences for society, but is 
also antidemocratic in its roots, since it is applied in practice from abstract, distant ideas, 
against the will of a majority of nationals, which doesn’t accept ongoing changes and 
suggested revisions” (Putin, 2013).  
This passage shows how President Putin draws the picture of Russia being the key 
state as a guarantor of stability on the regional or global level, but at the same time, this 
strong state or pole of international politics, is opposing main or universally accepted 
understandings and definitions of human rights, liberty etc and suggests that Kremlin will 
be standing in defense of “traditional values” which are under threat from ideas “imposed” 
from above. At the same time, this part of his speech is vital for following study, since it 
demonstrates how within the discourse articulated by the Russian political elite, 
understanding of democracy or signifier in this case, changes meaning in relations to the 
nodal point, which is traditional values. He articulates this discourse farther by projecting it 
on the rest of the world and especially appealing to the societies in near abroad.  
“And we know that in the world more people support our position in support of 
traditional values, which for thousands of years constitute spiritual, moral bases of 
civilization and every nation: values of the traditional family, real human life, including 
religious life, not only material but spiritual life, humanity and multicultural world’s values. 
Of course, this is a conservative position, but speaking with the words of Nicolay 
Berdyaev, idea of conservatism is not that it halts movement ahead, but it stops moving 
back and down, to the darkness of chaos, return to the primitive condition. In recent years 
we have observed how attempts to impose so called more progressive model of 
development by other countries have in fact turned into regress, barbarism, big blood” 
(Putin, 2013).  
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This discourse is further articulated and more broadly projected by Putin’s latest 
annual address to the Federal Assembly i.e. From December 2014. In the very first 
paragraphs of his speech the head of the Russian state touches Orthodox Christianity and 
spirituality as important and inseparable from Russian politics. While speaking of 
annexation of the Crimean peninsula and integrating it into the Russian state, President 
Putin says:  
“For our country, for our nation this event is especially important. Since, in Crimea 
our people are living, and territory itself is strategically important, as there lays the spiritual 
beginning of diverse, but monolithic Russian nation and centralized Russian state. Here, in 
Crimea, in old Chersonese, or as Russian historians called it, Korsun, Prince Vladimir was 
baptized and later baptized the rest of the Rus. … Christianity was a strong spiritual uniting 
force that allowed, including in the formation of the united Russian nation and the 
emergence of common statehood different tribes and tribal unions of whole East-Slavic 
world. ... And this gives us bases to say that for Russia, the Crimea, old Korsun, 
Chersonese, and Sevastopol, have huge civilizational and sacred meaning. Like the temple 
mount in Jerusalem for those who are followers of Islam or Judaism.” (Putin, 2014).  
This opening passage shows how Orthodoxy is introduced in the ongoing discourse 
articulated by the Russian political elite and how this appeal to conservatism and traditions 
are brought in as a justification for foreign politics. As it is argued in this study, such 
articulated appeals and becomes gains popularity among the population not only in Russia 
but in the near-aboard. Especially, within the countries, the majority of which is Orthodox. 
Case of Georgia will be discussed in the second part of the study.  
In this speech, Putin once again offers a good example of redefining meanings of 
certain notions, or how concepts can be understood differently once they are defined in 
relations to the nodal point.  
“If for number of European countries national pride is long time forgotten concept, 
while sovereignty is – too much of a luxury, for Russia national sovereignty is – absolutely 
necessary condition for its existence.” (Putin, 2014).  
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Or in other words, while in Europe debates, political as well as scholarly, are 
differently viewing the concept of nationalism or sovereignty vs. supranationality, President 
Putin is apparently trying to articulate alternative discourse by portraying European 
countries as not being really sovereign while Russian Federation stand on the side of 
protecting and guaranteeing this “national pride.”  
President Putin goes even further with the traditional values by equating it with 
“healthy family” and subsequently with “healthy nation.” “Healthy family and healthy 
nation, traditional values given by our ancestors in combination with future visions, 
stability as conditions for development and progress, respect to other nations and states 
along with guarantees of providing security of Russia and defending its legal interests – 
these are our priorities” (Putin, 2014).  
In order to better illustrate discourse articulated and its consequences, besides last 
three annual addresses of the president to the Federal Assembly, Putin’s speech on such 
major occasion, as annexations of Crimea is, should be analyzed. Discourse analysis should 
provide some insights on how Orthodox Christianity and traditions are employed as the 
nodal point around which normative hegemony is articulated and how it is projected on 
audience inside or outside the Russian Federation. Within the first few sentences, speaking 
about the referendum in Crimea and why people, living on peninsula “chose to live with 
Russia”, president Putin claims:  
“This is the location of ancient Khersones, where Prince Vladimir was baptized. His 
spiritual feat of adopting Orthodoxy predetermined the overall basis of the culture, 
civilization and human values that unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus…“ he 
continues “There was a whole series of controlled “color” revolutions. Clearly, the people 
in those nations, where these events took place, were sick of tyranny and poverty, of their 
lack of prospects; but these feelings were taken advantage of cynically. Standards were 
imposed on these nations that did not in any way correspond to their way of life, traditions, 
or these peoples’ cultures. As a result, instead of democracy and freedom, there was chaos, 
outbreaks of violence and a series of upheavals” (Putin, 2014). 
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These passages show how president Putin is trying to appeal to Orthodox 
Christianity and on the bases of these portray Crimea as a sacred place for Russians. This 
argument or rather justification was employed and further deepened in his annual address 
of the same year which was analyzed above. President Putin also tries to alter the existing 
discourse of so called color revolutions being the success of liberal-democracy and by 
referring to culture and traditions, offer an alternative narrative of the story. The discourse 
articulated by Russian president is not only about pure economic or military threats, such as 
NATO presence in Sevastopol is, but about the notion that it also threatens their culture, 
identity and system of values.  
At the same time he argues that Russia is the only strong and stable sovereign, 
therefore Crimea, common historical legacy should be part of it. “Otherwise, dear friends, 
(I’m addressing both Ukraine and Russia), you and we – the Russians and the Ukrainians – 
could lose Crimea completely, and that could happen in the near historical perspective. 
Please think about it” (Putin, 2014). 
To further uncover discourse articulated in this speech, what Putin argues, is that 
Crimea, which is sacred, holy place for Orthodox Christians and at the same time common 
historical legacy of Ukraine and Russia was under threat from the West and the only way to 
save it, was to integrate it into the Russian Federation. This is not only justification or an 
excuse, but this message has wider implications. It is mostly appealing to the society in the 
Russian Federation and countries of so called near abroad. It carries the idea that the West 
presents a threat to culture and history, while Russia stands as a guarantor and defender of 
sacred values.  
Discourse articulated by the Russian Orthodox Church 
It is important to look at how the Russian Orthodox Church articulates and repeats 
the same discourse. But since the Church itself is preoccupied with normative issues it is 
almost impossible to cover all the addresses and speeches within the scope of one study. 
Even if the focus is only on Patriarch as a head of the ROC, it is still impossible to limit 
available data. Therefore, for the purpose of illustrating discourse of the normative 
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hegemony of the Russia versus the West, being present in the Russian Orthodox Church, 
randomly, those recent statements and interviews of the Patriarch Kirill and will be 
analyzed, which reflect upon this discourse.  
In the March of 2014, Patriarch Kirill made a comment about new options on 
Facebook which can allow users to choose its own gender out of fifty available options. He 
is quoted to have called it a clinical case and said: 
 
“The destruction of traditional values today also affects interpersonal relationships.  We 
know that this challenges the fact that marriage is the relationship between a man and a 
woman, that gender selection is not an intellectual or volitional choice, but rather God’s 
choice. … Yet, today this clinical case is protected by law in many countries. And children 
are taught this, being told: you can choose yourself whether you are a boy or a girl” (As 
cited by Pravmir.com, 2014). 
This passage shows how the head of the Russian Orthodox Church is repeating the 
same discourse that in the certain countries, which logically means in the West, values are 
changing and reviewed, which is viewed as a thread to the traditional system of values. He 
also redefined understanding of freedom in relations to the nodal point, which is used as a 
departure point for the following study. Within the same comment about the possibility of 
choosing gender on Facebook by saying: 
 “But then, what is freedom like? If freedom ruins the Divine plan of the world and 
of mankind, then it is not freedom, but slavery. And we know that the devil enslaves a man, 
because the most dangerous captivity is to be not free from sin, when a person cannot live 
in accordance with his or her calling” (As cited by Pravoslavie.ru, 2014). It illustrates how 
meaning and understanding of certain notions, such as freedom in this case, changes and is 
being rearticulated while applied to the nodal point, which is an Orthodox Christianity for 
this study.  
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In July of one year before this statement, in 2013, in his Sunday service, Patriarch 
Kirill spoke of the West and characterized same sex marriages as the sign of apocalypses. 
At the same time called Russian political elite to ensure that this never happens in Russia. 
“This is a very dangerous apocalyptic symptom, and we must do everything in our powers 
to ensure that sin is never sanctioned in Russia by state law, because that would mean that 
the nation has embarked on a path of self‐destruction” (As cited by Russia Today, 2013). In 
his address, once again it can be observed how the notions are redefined and reviewed in 
relations to the nodal points. Patriarch Kirill points out: “Where sin is elected through 
freedom, there comes death, terror and dictatorship.” He also pointed out that it leads to the 
“self-destruction of nation” (As cited by Russia Today, 2013).  
Patriarch Kirill also shares President Putin’s support of strong state and institutions. 
While meeting with students in the year 2012, not too long after the scandal with Pussy 
Riot, head of the Russian Orthodox Church, not only spoke about threats to the institution 
of the Church, but he proclaimed a strong state to be the guarantor or a defender of the 
traditional value system from degradations. Something similar to the discourse articulated 
by the President Putin, can be observed. Patriarch Kirill is quoted to have said: 
“The institution of power appeared in the world, in a society prone to sin, to 
safeguard this society so that people could live together. … So, clear and very definite 
support of the Orthodox Church for the institution of state authorities does not amount to an 
assessment of this or that politician or state figure by every representative of the Church… 
But it is indispensable to understand that safeguarding the institution of power is a 
guarantee of a flourishing society” (As cited by the Reuters, 2012). 
This discourse is articulated not only for domestic audience, but is projected outside 
as well. While visiting another Orthodox country and close ally of Russia, Serbia, Patriarch 
Kirill condemned secularization in Europe and compared it to the apocalypses. He harshly 
criticized Europe and blamed it in “abandoning its Christian identity,” while same sex 
marriages and unions, according to the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, became 
“locomotive of destructive processes,” across the whole Europe. He also called upon the 
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people of Serbia to “help bring Europe back to Christian values” (As cited by the National 
Secular Society, 2014). This illustrates how the normative discourse of the West is 
perceived by the Russian clergy as perverted and deviant and how Russian version, based 
strictly on conservative values and backed by the Orthodox Christianity is projected as an 
alternative which can save “Godless” Europe. And calling upon the Serbian people to help 
to “save” Europe is not a coincidence either. Since Serbia is an Orthox country, unlike the 
majority of the Western European countries, therefore, this discourse of the Orthodox 
civilization versus the West, it is considered on the side of the former.  
Under Putin’s presidency, another important event took place, which once again 
demonstrated link between the Church and the State getting stronger and more visible in the 
Russian politics. In January of 2015, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch 
Kirill delivered speech in the Russian State Duma. This has been the first time ever in the 
history of the modern Russian state, head of the Church addresses parliament members 
from the parliament tribune. But this speech is not interesting for the following study only 
from this perspective, it is important, since in it, Patriarch Kirill once again touched upon 
the issue of “traditional value system” being under threat and of necessity to protect them.  
Within the opening passage of his speech, Patriarch Kirill says: “The world, in 
which we live, is often referred as post-Christian, and sometimes post-religious. Behind this 
term lies the terrible diagnosis of spiritual and moral state in which society has appeared in 
many countries. ... Because, as a result, the boundaries between good and evil are blurred, 
and the concept of justice rooted in the moral nature of man, which is universal, is 
interpreted in accordance with the prevailing philosophy and even political attitudes” 
(Kirill, 2015). 
Similarity between the wording and texts Putin employs in his speeches, which 
were analyzed above and Patriarch’s address is obvious to any reader. Revision of morality, 
the boundaries between good and evil being “blurred.” It is exactly the same discourse 
President Putin is articulating and projecting.  
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“The idea of the absolute priority of freedom, freedom of choice, and I underline, 
rejection of priority of a moral norm became a certain type of slow-motion bomb for the 
Western civilization, destructing effect of which becomes fully obvious only to us, people 
of XXI century, as our ancestors, being under the spell of the topic of freedom, we're 
supporting various innovations (новеллы) including legislative, not thinking about the fact 
that absolutisation of freedom of choice in distance from normative parts is deadly for 
human and society. Because you can select an evil” (Kirill, 2015). 
He further attacked the European system of values, by saying that concept of 
equality of right and freedom, if it is transferred into from philosophical debates into 
practice by the legislative system, it has “deplorable” consequences on human society, 
affecting “the personal and social morality. … Examples are known. This legalization of 
so-called same-sex unions, and the legalization of euthanasia, and an introduction to the 
social life of certain hazardous elements of the juvenile justice system. All these legally 
binding novels, sometimes contradicting not only moral values, but even and universal 
common sense and instinct for self-preservation are becoming more and more widespread 
and recognized by some states” (Kirill, 2015). 
In the next part of his speech, Patriarch Kirill divides Russian history into several 
parts and talks about certain characteristics of each epoch. When it comes to the 
contemporary Russian statehood, he says: “Finally, the new Russia… We began to focus on 
human rights, the rights of people to human dignity, liberty. Is it possible to ignore it and 
say that it's bad? And we have designated this era the word dignity. And it happened: faith, 
great power, justice, solidarity and dignity” (Kirill, 2015). 
This passage illustrates how around nodal points, when the discourse is articulated, 
certain notions change meaning. Liberty, dignity, understanding of those concepts, from the 
perspective of the Russian Orthodox Church is different from the Western narrative. And 
this difference is explained by the fact that once they are contrasted to the nodal point such 
conservative or traditional values are, they change meanings according to the discourse 
being articulated.  
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The head of the Russian Orthodox Church also redefines meaning of pluralism and 
politics in his speech, by articulating an alternative understanding. “I believe that in a 
society, traditional for Russia, if you want a compassionate society, political parties must 
not compete in terms of contrasting different values, such as freedom and justice, statehood 
and dignity. ... Basic sphere is a sphere of values. And this basis of values shouldn’t be 
destroyed by any party in Russia. Because there will be no Russia. And with gratitude to 
God testify that the current composition of the Duma practically embodies what I have just 
said” (Kirill, 2015). 
Patriarch also called for referring to conservative discourse, by saying that there is a 
need of new worldwide synthesis, “the purpose of which is to take all that was best in our 
past and build on this basis, the foundation of the future. … Within these walls I would like 
to say that to a large extent, on the positions of the Russian parliament members will 
depend the ability of our country to be loyal to its values, its way, its ancient and eternal 
choice” (Kirill, 2015). 
Patriarch Kirill also spoke about the importance of legislation and laws, which 
should protect family and parents right to educate their children in the spirit of “their own 
world view and traditional moral values” (Kirill, 2015). He also praised works done by the 
inter-fractional group created in the State Duma in 2012, which is focused on defense of 
Christian values and Patriarch welcomed the suggestion of expanding it at the expense of 
the members of the Federation Council and regional legislatives (Kirill, 2015). This is an 
interesting point, since it illustrates how Christian values which are associated with 
conservative and traditional value systems in Russia are getting more and more deeply 
involved in the politics. Normative discourse is overtaking discourses not only on the 
regional level, but its reaching top of the Russian political elite.  
Within the same speech, Patriarch Kirill also repeated discourse, articulated by the 
President Putin, by equating national identity with moral values. He said that normative 
component should be more broadly present in the schools. As Patriarch claims, foundations 
of religious cultures has only 34 hours, which is “drop in the sea,” while, according to him, 
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this course won’t only raise moral consciousness, but also “national identity, it is aimed at 
protection of all the values we just have been talking about” (Kirill, 2015).  
Discourse analysis of the Patriarch Kirill’s speeches and interviews illustrate how 
the Russian Orthodox Church occupies key place in the Gramscian formula of the state 
being equal to the political society plus civil society, and how as a civil institution it 
projects and maintains normative hegemony domestically or abroad.  
 


















The Russian alternative world order projected on Georgia  
The title of the present study is “The Russia and The West, Struggle for Normative 
Hegemony.” The normative hegemony constructed by the Russian political elite and it, 
being projected on to the domestic society has been covered so far. While societies in the 
neighboring countries of Russia, which try to free themselves from the Kremlin’s influence 
and get closer to the EU, become the battlefield between the normative hegemonies of the 
Russian Federation and the West. Particular institutions appear in those societies which 
project hegemony articulated either by one side or another. Case of Georgia will be 
analyzed within this research and it will be illustrated how two value systems affect society. 
An attempt will be made to demonstrate, that despite Georgia has already signed an 
association agreement with the EU and is trying to implement reforms, so that it gets closer 
to this alliance, a society within Georgia is struggling to accept certain values embodies 
within the Western normative discourse. This dilemma is a perfect opportunity for the 
Russian political elite to project its own discourse on the Georgian society and maintain its 
normative hegemony, which can be supported by such institution of the civil society, such 
as the Georgian Orthodox Church, NGOs and media. They share many common values 
with the Russian counterpart and is more distant from the western European discourse. This 
will be illustrated below by conducting discourse analysis of the speeches epistles and 
interviews of the Patriarch Ilia II, who is the head of the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) 
and several online-publishers and NGOs which are closely associated with the Church and 
at the same time share same discourse which is articulated by the Russian political elite. 
Within the scope of this research main representatives of the Georgian Political elite will 
not be covered, since due to the legacy of the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 and subsequent 
occupation and recognition of independence of the two Georgian regions by the Russian 
Federation. Openly supporting Kremlin or calls for rejecting the Euro-Atlantic future of 
Georgia equals to political suicide in the Georgian politics. To illustrate this point better, an 
example should be provided. Nino Burjanadze and her party is strongest and most popular 
out of the political groups in Georgia that are associated with Russia and openly call for 
39 
 
dialogue with the Kremlin. Nino Burjanadze is quoted to have said that Georgia should 
decide between “illusionary NATO membership” and possibility of restoring its territorial 
integrity (As cited by Civil Georgia, 2014). Despite there is not even diplomatic relations 
between two countries, she has visited Moscow and has personally met Vladimir Putin, 
while being in opposition. In Russia, Burjanadze has remarked “unfortunately in recent 
years Russian-Georgian relations have actually dropped to a tragic deadlock. … I am more 
than sure, that it is not only in the interests of Georgia to normalize relations between our 
two peoples. … Normal relations between Georgia and Russia is needed for peaceful 
development of the entire region and for our peoples. … I am absolutely sure, that normal 
relations with Russia is in the interest of my people, of my state, as well as in the interest of 
your people and of your state.” (As cited by Civil Georgia, 2010). While Putin, being prime 
minister at that time, has said: “Life moves forward and I very much hope, that by relying 
on those people, who want to have normal relations with Russia, we will be able to restore 
the pre-crisis level of our relations” (As cited by Civil Georgia, 2010). 
At the same time, the political party of Nino Burjanadze carries the same discourse 
about traditional values being under threat from the West, which is articulated by the 
Russian Political elite. Several quotations from her interview about the developments which 
took place in Tbilisi on 17th of May of 2013 should illustrate this point. Commenting on 
the aggressive disruption by the Orthodox Christians of the peaceful rally in memory of the 
victims of homophobia, she said: “This group tries to introduce propaganda of what is not 
acceptable not only for our state and faith, but as Patriarch said in his address, for all 
religions and normal countries is unacceptable. Of course, private life of each individual 
should be protected, of course man shouldn’t be discriminated based on any kind of 
difference which he/she is characterized by, but that doesn’t mean that we should be 
imposed stranger and unacceptable values, even if it can be called value at all, and 
propagate what is unacceptable” (As cited by News.ge, 2013). 
She tries to appeal to traditional, conservative values and the Orthodox Christianity, 
sympathies towards which are quite high in the Georgian society, but despite this discourse, 
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still, Nino Burjanadze’s political party was not able to get more than 10% of votes in the 
latest Presidential elections in the year 2013 (Election Guide, 2013).  
Therefore, the normative hegemony of Russia from Neo-Gramscian perspective is 
articulated and projected through civil society and institutions which are part of it. In the 
case of Georgia, the core institution is the Georgian Orthodox Church and NGOs associated 
with it. Despite, as it will be illustrated below, heads of the GOC have publicly expressed 
their sympathies towards the Russian political elite, unlike Nino Burjanadze, they still 
maintain support of the majority of the population. Therefore, it is exactly where Russian 
normative hegemony can dwell on and compete with the Western normative discourse, 
which is popular among the Political elite of Georgia and is expressed in publicly declared 
Euro-Atlantic future of Georgia and in several types of reforms strengthening minority 
rights and their protection. With the appeal to the traditional values being under danger 
from the West, civil society can consequently alter political attitudes of the Georgian 
society and in the long run, challenge the Western normative discourse.  
Before going to the discourse analysis, it is important to explain why exactly the 
Georgian Orthodox Church is considered to be the institution which can maintain the 
Russian normative hegemony in the region. Why it can be considered as a main link 
between the Georgian society and an alternative world order articulated within the Russian 
discourse. For this purpose, it is important to take a look at surveys which shows the level 
of the trust in the GOC among the citizens of Georgia. The results of the opinion polls 
known as the Caucasus Barometer should be referred. The Caucasus Barometer is an 
annual survey conducted by the Caucasus Research Resource Center (CRRC) in three 
countries of the South Caucasus. Most recent surveys covering issues important for the 
present study were conducted in 2013. The following figures are taken from this survey 
(Caucasus Barometer, 2013). 
41 
 
Table 4: Level of trust in the Georgian Orthodox Church in the Georgian population 
       (Caucasus Barometer, 2013). 
As it can be seen from the following figure, 72% of respondents completely trust 
the Georgian Orthodox Church, in addition to 10% of those who trust. This number is 
significant as it illustrates how influential this institution can be.  According to International 
Republican Institute (IRI) surveys on Georgia from February of 2014, 94% of the 
population trusts the Georgian Orthodox Church. While the same figure for Parliament is 
68%, for prime minister 67% and for the President’s office – 64% (Agenda.ge, 2014). 
These figures are significant since they illustrate that trust in the Georgian Orthodox 
Church is way higher than in any state institution. And if former projects same discourse 
which is articulated by the Russian political elite, then it can become the main link between 
the Russian alternative world order and the Georgian society against the Western normative 
hegemony. Especially, considering the fact, that sympathies towards conservative and so 
called “traditional” values are high among the citizens of the South Caucasian republic. The 
following figures are taken from the Caucasus Barometer from 2011 which illustrates 
respondents’ attitudes toward homosexuality in Georgia (Caucasus Barometer, 2011). 
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Table 5: Georgians opinion whether homosexuality can be justified or not:  
       (Caucasus Barometer, 2011).  
 
According to these figures, 88% finds homosexuality never justified while 0% is for 
always justified or justified. This illustrates that the majority of the Georgian society can 
find appealing discourse of the Russian alternative world order where the West is portrayed 
as pervert, dangerous and “children have to be protected from gay propaganda.”  
LGBT rights are one of the issues, developments around which illustrate the 
struggle for normative hegemony between the West and Russia taking place in Georgia. 
Two recent events should be discussed below, in order to demonstrate this claim better. 
One is disruption of the peaceful rally on the 17th of May of 2013 in Tbilisi and another is 
developments around bill adopted by the Georgian Parliament against all kinds of 
discrimination.  
17th of May is an international day against homophobia, when people all around the 
world pay tribute to the victims of the homophobia. The Georgian LGBT group decided to 
organize peaceful rally in the city center, in connections with this day. Discourse taking 
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place before and after these developments illustrate how the Church and the political elite 
of Georgia stand on different sides. The former is close to the Russian world order while 
latter shares Western discourse. Prime minister of Georgia at that time, Bidzina Ivanishvili, 
while commenting on upcoming LGBT demonstration, is quoted to have said that sexual 
minorities have the same rights as other citizens and society will gradually get used to 
accepting them as equals. He also noted that they will be protected from any attack (As 
cited by the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2013). While the head of the most influential 
institution in the country, Patriarch Ilia II called government to prevent this manifestation 
from happening and not to allow LGBT people to come out in the streets. He called 
homosexuality “anomaly and disease” and “an insult to Georgian traditions” (As cited by 
the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2013). Despite hundreds of police officers were 
present, they were not able to protect LGBT activists from thousands of Orthodox 
Christians led by priests and high hierarchs of the Georgian Orthodox Church. Police had to 
evacuate rally participants with special buses. Mottos and proclamations heard from the 
demonstration led by the clergy exactly repeat the same discourse which is articulated by 
the Russian political elite domestically and is projected outwards. “Stop homosexual 
propaganda in Georgia,” “rally that contradicts our Georgian morals and traditions” (As 
cited by the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2013). 
The discourse which followed these developments, once again illustrated diverse 
positions of the Church and the government. If former obviously shares normative 
discourse related to the one articulated by the Russian government, the political elite of 
Georgia, at least officially, falls in the Western normative discourse. Georgian Prime 
Minister at that time, Bidzina Ivanishvili, while addressing police two days after the rally, 
said:  
“You protect the safety of each and every citizen… and very often you do it at the 
expense of the safety of your own life. … A good example of that were developments in 
Tbilisi’s central square a day before yesterday, when you managed in dignity to provide 
safe passage for minorities so that they could protect their rights. You stood between 
majority and minority and when you saw that the need of protection of persons’ safety, 
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instead of freedom of expression, became number one priority and when, unfortunately, it 
was not possible to contain agitated majority, you put the entire burden on yourselves at the 
expense of your own safety and managed to escort the minority out of danger”  (As cited by 
Civil Georgia, 2013).  
While the chairman of the Parliament of Georgia, David Usupashvili, went even 
further by denouncing the statement made by Patriarch Ilia II, just the day before the rally 
was supposed to take place. ”I do not think that this statement contributed positively in 
respect of that specific day, because it was in itself already clear at the time [of making the 
statement] that the authorities could not have banned [the rally], demonstrators who were 
planning [anti-homophobia] rally would not have dropped their plans and for those people 
who were watching this rally with suspicion or aggressively this statement, to some extent, 
served as advice, indication, which empowered their position that ‘if the state does not ban 
[gay rights rally] then we will do it. … What is happening in the Church’s life, it is not our 
business, but when there is a talk about issues of secular life, such as where citizens should 
walk or not, where they can rally or not, in such situations we should agree that voicing a 
critical position or disagreeing and analyzing is the right thing to do and it’s necessary and 
everyone should get used to it, including representatives of the Church.” While asked about 
what he would say to thousands of people who were protesting against gay rally, he said: 
“We should get used to such simple facts that there are people with different views, 
different behavior and different taste and there are people who are simply different from 
us” (As cited by Civil Georgia, 2013). 
Patriarch Ilia II also condemned violence, but his position was different from the 
state authorities and closer to the Russian discourse. He said:  
“What happened on May 17 is very regrettable. …Ideas, which [gay rights activists] 
wanted to instill there, are completely unacceptable in Georgia. … In the country, where 
the absolute majority of the population is a follower of Christianity… and of other 
traditional religions, such rallies are perceived by the population as propaganda of 
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homosexuality, which causes their fair protest. …The country cannot tolerate legalization 
of a sin” (As cited by Civil Georgia, 2013). 
One year after this rally, the presence of the Russian discourse became even more 
obvious. With the suggestion of the Patriarch of Georgia, 17th of May was announced to be 
celebrating the strength of family ties and purity. In the special statement issued by the 
Georgian Orthodox Church it says:  
“Destruction of purity of the family and declaration of unnatural and wrong 
relations as natural condition is unacceptable for majority of Georgian population despite 
their faith. … Church reveals sin and fights against sin itself, its public propaganda, 
because such attitude angers God and causes big punishment from God, therefore our 
Church tries to protect the nation from legalization of immorality and from spiritual 
violence” (As cited by Civil Georgia, 2014).  
“Propaganda of homosexuality,” “legalizations of sin,” terms and notions which is 
articulated by the Russian political elite is present in the discourse of Georgian Orthodox 
Church and nodal points which are departing points (Orthodox Christianity, traditional 
values)  of discourse analysis applied within the scope of following study are present. It 
will be better illustrated below after more texts are analyzed. It also repeats the idea of 
traditional family ties being threatened by protecting LGBT people’s right and recognizing 
their equality.  
Anti-discrimination bill – another important event around which struggle for the 
normative hegemony of the West and Russia revealed itself in Georgia, was developments 
around the anti-discrimination bill, which the parliament of Georgia adopted in the spring 
of 2014. Based on the recommendations of the European Commission, as one of the key 
reform on the way of visa liberalization, Georgian parliament adopted a law against all 
types of discrimination, including based on sexual orientation or gender identity. This 
formulation caused concerns of religious groups and even high hierarchs of the Georgian 
Orthodox Church publicly called the parliament to reject this bill. Patriarch of the GOC, Ilia 
II is quoted to have said:  
46 
 
“Based on God’s teachings, society of believers fairly think of non-traditional 
relations as deadly sin, while anti-discrimination bill in current form is thought to be 
propaganda and legalization of this sin” (As cited by Tabula, 2014). The GOC asked 
parliament to postpone the hearing and engage with the Church and the wider society in 
further discussions about the bill.  
Archpriest Theordore Gignadze, who is quite popular by appearing in different talk 
shows and giving public lectures and meetings in various universities, in one of his 
interviews commented about the above mentioned bill: 
 “I share Patriarch’s position – this law is dangerous for Georgia’s future. Where 
there is no Christ, we have nothing to do there. … On the example of Holland, we can 
easily see what the problems, this law implies. 50 years ago lifestyle in this country was 
radically different. Families were patriarchal and traditions were respected. Today 
propaganda of same-sex marriages and depravity is going on. Pedophilia and incest have 
almost become the norm. Is it said that the drop can drill a stone. This law will be the 
beginning of planting poison in humans’ consciousness and these sins will gradually 
become norms among us” (As cited by Kviris Paltira, 2014).  
This shows how discourse articulated by the Kremlin is shared by the Georgian 
Orthodox Church and projected onto the society. Gay propaganda, pedophilia, the West 
being pervert, is present in the discourse articulated by the hierarchs of the Georgian 
Orthodox Church, in the same way, the Russian political elite does.  
In the end, Georgian political elite managed to stay within the western normative 
discourse and the bill was still adopted with the terms “sexual orientation” and “gender 
identity” remaining in it. Patriarch Ilia II expressed his dissatisfaction with following 
comment:  
“None of the believers will accept such law. How is it possible to legalize illegal. 
Legalization of illegality is a big sin and that’s what I said and if I haven’t said that it would 
be surprising and wonder. I had to say it, none of the believers will accept it and I want to 
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say that as time will pass by, we will be surprised how this law was accepted. God will 
forgive our sins” (As cited by Liberali, 2014). 
In his epistle which was delivered on the Easter holiday in 2012, and was 
approximately two weeks after the Russian Parliament adopted a law concerning gay 
propaganda, Patriarch of Georgia, Ilia II raised the issue of gay propaganda in Georgia, 
“false freedom” and vulgarity. He repeated same discourse, which was articulated by the 
Russian political elite. Some passages from epistle:  
“”New attitudes” towards social life has been expressed in an attempt to make 
people forget the sense of sin and new principle has been employed: any action is 
acceptable, if it doesn’t limit somebody else’s freedom. For instance: if somebody’s 
vulgarity doesn’t harm me, it’s not negative anymore… Followers of secularism have 
advanced the idea of false freedom and therefore morality has been eradicated and finally 
presented such principle: whatever I want is natural, permissible and acceptable! ...  
Absolute truth doesn’t exist anymore, only individual “truths.” … It is the complete 
antipode of the absolute truth. This is such supremacy of the sin and the devil, which 
humanity doesn’t remember! Such reasoning and attitudes are propagated everywhere, 
including in Georgia. … Expression of such “new ideology” is … popularization of 
“heroes” committing sins of Sodom-Gomorra” (As cited by NetGazeti, 2012). 
These passages illustrate how the meanings of certain notions are changed when 
they are applied to certain nodal points of the following study. The idea of “false freedom” 
or freedom which is differently understood in the West because they are not Christians 
enough, or “propaganda” of sins and immoral life going on, with special accent on 
homosexuality, “sins of Sodom-Gomorra,” this is the exactly same discourse we meet in 
the Russian political elite currently and it is transferred to the Georgian society through the 
hierarchs of the Georgian Orthodox Church.  
One of the best examples how the Russian normative discourse of the West versus 
the Russian alternative world order is shared and projected through the Georgian Orthodox 
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Church in recent years, is epistle delivered by the Patriarch Ilia II on Christmas eve of 
2014. Some passages should be mentioned below.  
“In every epoch Christianity faced challenges, but contemporary post-modern epoch 
is exceptional with its mega-challenges… The main idea of post-modernism is that the 
vision of truth based on certain religions, since, according to them, all, who think that know 
the truth, are mistaken… Only those who don’t judge are right. For such reasons, there is 
no right or wrong anymore. … Taboo should be unfastened of everything! Should get rid of 
past’s moral limits, everything is good what I want and I like! But during assessment, one 
vital rule should be upheld – others’, especially minorities’ rights shouldn’t be violated! 
That’s the law. As the result, the boundary between good and bad behavior, between truth 
and falsity is lost. … There is a fundamental difference between “freedom” suggested by 
pseudo-Liberalism and Christian teachings” (As cited by Tabula, 2014).  
Boundaries between good and bad being blurred and erased, it is exactly the same 
discourse the President Putin and Patriarch Kirill articulate. Within the same epistle, 
Patriarch blames “secular ideology” responsible for portraying human as an independent 
from God. He declares it responsible for losing “moral and spiritual orients” by justifying it 
with individualism. “It is fighting from every direction against traditional values, 
upbringing and moral” (As cited by Tabula, 2014). He goes further to argue that the main 
expression of the current crisis is right of sexual minorities to get married and adopt kids. 
Patriarch also mentions Europe in his epistle by saying that European politicians should 
take into consideration traditions of certain countries and give that freedom of choice, so 
that societies within these countries would be more willing to be connected with 
contemporary Europe (As cited by Tabula, 2014). This passage show how Europe is 
portrayed as something which might threaten “traditions” and values of the Georgian 
people and therefore Georgia’s European future might be under question as society might 
not relate to the Western normative discourse and find an alternative more appealing, the 
Russian world order, in this case.  
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Besides sharing value systems, Patriarch of the Georgian Orthodox Church has 
close personal ties with the clergy of the ROC and political elite in the Kremlin. Ilia II, 
since the August War of 2008, has several times visited Moscow and personally met 
President Putin. In 2013, while meeting Putin, he is quoted to have said:  
“The aim of my visit is to start improving those mistakes, which were made… I had 
a meeting with Vladimir Putin and we agreed that it cannot go on like this. President of 
Russia is doing everything so that we can stay brothers. What happened wasn’t fault of 
Russia or Georgia, it was fault of certain persons. … Love between Georgia and Russia will 
last forever” (As cited by Tabula, 2013). 
In February of 2013, in social media appeared a short video clip, which shows part 
of Patriarch’s speech, supposedly delivered while he was visiting Moscow one month 
earlier. He speaks of President Putin and Georgia-Russian relations as following:  
“I want to say that relations between Russia and Georgia were always, and will be, 
brotherly and friendly. Russia and Georgia were brothers in the past, but maybe somebody 
got jealous of our good terms and artificially caused enmity. I had met with his highness the 
President of the Russian Federation, Mr. Vladimir Putin. I had met before as well, but this 
warmth and this attention which was expressed by the President Putin was special and hope 
giver. I think that he is the person, the wise person, who will definitely improve the 
situation in Georgia and Georgia will be united” (Ilia II, 2013).   
Later in the same year, (2013), Patriarch Ilia II visited Moscow again, in connection 
with celebration of 1025th anniversary of historic Rus becoming Christian. Within the scope 
of the visit, he gave an interview to local media, where, some interesting messages for this 
study were projected. He speaks of the importance of the religious ties between two 
countries, of pilgrims coming from Russia to Georgia or vice-versa and so on. Then 
Georgian Patriarch speaks of importance of negotiations between two governments and 
once again repeats the idea that since both Georgia and Russia are Orthodox Christian 
countries, they are destined to be in good terms with each other. But he also goes further 
and claims that culture also unites the two nations. “So, I think that we, as Orthodox 
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nations, Russians and Georgians, we will find an exit from this difficult situation. I love 
Russia very much. I received an education there. … We are united with everything, not 
only religion, not only Orthodoxy, - our culture. Georgia loves Russian culture…. First of 
all, we live in a very difficult time – time of Globalization. Russia and Georgia have 
collected many spiritual values. And therefore we should carefully look after, so that those 
values aren’t lost – our faith, our homeland, our culture” (Caucasus Politics, 2013). 
It shows how, according to the most influential and trustworthy public figure in the 
Georgian society, Orthodox Christianity, traditional and spiritual values, should bring two 
countries together, despite the war legacy and nonexistence of diplomatic relations. Or in 
other words, why alternative Russian world order, articulated by the political elite in the 
Kremlin, should be attractive for the Georgian society.  
Besides the Georgian Orthodox Church, other important institutions which can play 
key role in maintaining and projecting the Russian normative hegemony are non-
governmental organizations and media. After the August War of 2008, several NGOs 
started to appear in Georgia, which are closely associated with the GOC, Russian political 
elite and discourse. As Gramsci claimed, media and publishing can play important role in 
maintaining hegemony. Those NGOs which will be mentioned below, either have several 
online newspapers, or are listed as partners of online newspapers which projects perverted 
West versus the Orthodox civilization discourse. In order to illustrate how those 
organizations work within the civil society for producing and maintaining the Russian 
normative hegemony, some of them should be analyzed in more details.  
Erekle II’s Society – first of all, it should be noted that the name itself already 
indicates what this NGO stands for. King Erekle II is the ruler of the Georgian kingdom 
from the end of XVIII century, when it signed a treaty with the Russian empire asking for 
protection. Therefore, in the Georgian society’s memory, Erekle II’s name is associated 
with foreign policy oriented on Russia. The society itself, according to the information 
provided on their website was founded in 2008, after the Russo-Georgian war and it claims 
that founders understand that peace and development in the region cannot be achieved 
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without consideration of the “Northern” vector or in other words the Russian Federation, 
which borders Georgia from the North. Among the aims of the organization is listed 
“propaganda of the Russian culture and art in Georgia.” Giving free Russian language 
classes for Georgian citizens as well as supporting the enhancement of the political 
dialogue between two countries (Erekle Second’s Society). At the same time, it publishes 
newspapers in both Russian and Georgian and maintains internet TV named “Patriot TV.” 
It broadcasts online talk show hosted by one of the founders, Archil Chkoidze, and projects 
the same discourse what the Russian political elite has articulated. For example, from the 
video of February of 08 of 2015, he has a priest, as a guest, and following messages is 
projected, that there is “direct propaganda” of homosexuality and other sins in the country 
and “God will never forgive condemnation of the holy spirit” to anyone. Host of the show 
also blames the government, saying that with the adoption of anti-discrimination bill, 
government legalizes this sin (Patriot TV, 2015). Or from another video from the 25th of 
February of 2015, one of the guests of the show says that propaganda of depravity is going 
on from all main TV shows and it should be prosecuted by the criminal code (Patriot TV, 
2015). Or in other words, it is exactly what Russian legislation does with banning “gay 
propaganda.” Archil Chkoidze also publicly, several times expressed his support for 
Georgia’s membership in the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union and his close links with 
representatives of the Russian political elite. During one of his press-conferences from 
2013, he is quoted to have said the following:  
“I had meetings in the MST (Moscow State University) with those political 
scientists who are close to the Kremlin. Alexander Dugin, among them. … They already 
talk that if Georgia changes its direction and renews strategic partnership with Russia, 
Russia will definitely support Georgia in resolving conflicts” (As cited by NetGazeti, 
2014).  He also speaks of the ambassador of the United States to Georgia, as a “governor” 
of Georgia, appointed by the West, who doesn’t let representatives of the Georgian 
diaspora in Russia, which has close ties with the Kremlin, to serve their country. Chkoidze, 
on the same press conference also demanded from the government to conduct a referendum 
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to determine whether Georgian population supports Russia or Europe (As cited by 
NetGazeti, 2014).   
In the spring of 2014, screenshot from Facebook appeared which was widely 
discussed in the social media. Alexander Dugin, a political scientist who is closely 
associated with the Kremlin and is well known for his anti-Western rhetoric, shared a video 
on his wall from the Erekle Second’s Society’s event regarding threats from NATO and 
why Georgia should prefer Russian lead alliance to the Western organizations. Dugin called 
Chkoidze “Eurasian hero of Georgia” who is “fighting against Atlanticists” in the “most 
difficult region.” Archil Chkoidze commented on the link, thanking Dugin for the warm 
words, saying that his lectures and works helped him to see the real idea of the Eurasianism 
and that he hopes his “fellow citizens” (Georgians) will understand it soon as well. He 
confirmed to the media that it was his real comment made on an official Facebook page of 
Alexander Dugin (Ambebi.ge, 2014). It should be noted that the main idea of the Dugin’s 
works is that Eurasianism, as an alternative to the Americanism, should be created on the 
bases of the Orthodox civilization (Curanovic, 2012, p.117).  
Another NGO which should be considered as a part of the civil society, on which 
Russian normative hegemony can be relied, is the Eurasian Institute. It was founded in 
2009. It uses monument of the King Erekle II as its logo on the website. There, a full report 
of their activities can be also found. But due to the limits of the study, only those activities 
will be mentioned, which are important for following research.  
In November of 2012 oppositional politicians, economists and experts from Baltic 
countries were invited to attend a conference hosted by the Eurasian Institute in Tbilisi, in 
order to provide Georgian society with the real information about how membership in 
NATO and EU has “limited their sovereignty.” And it’s not too different from the Soviet 
times. As the report says, in order to show to Georgians that “not only provocative live in 
the Baltics, but objective and well-wishers to Georgia as well” (Eurasian Institute, 2014, p. 
9).   
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The European Union limiting sovereignty of nations is the exact same type of 
discourse which President Putin uses to portray Russia as a defender of the traditions and 
the West as a deviant, which has abandoned the real values.   
In the February of 2013, the Eurasian Institute organized first public discussion 
about the Russo-Georgian relations. Representatives of the so called intelligentsia were 
taking part. As it is noted in the report: “Special assessment was given to the role of the 
Patriarch of Georgia Ilia II in keeping spiritual ties between two Orthodox nations” 
(Eurasian Institute, 2014, pp. 10-11).  
Especially worth of attention for this study is showing a movie about bombing of 
Yugoslavia by the NATO forces in two major cities in Georgia, in Batumi and Tbilisi. As it 
is said in the report, aim of this event was to “remind to the society and give those facts 
which are connected with the battle of the North-Atlantic Alliance not only against the 
Yugoslavian state but against the Orthodox civilization” (Eurasian Institute, 2014, p. 19). 
After the movie, manifestation was held, in support of Serbian people and Serbian 
monasteries and sacred places which were destroyed by bombing. It caused irritation of 
“Nationals” (the political party of the former President Mikhail Saakashvili, which is 
closely associated with the West) and “LGBT groups,” according to the report (Eurasian 
Institute, 2014, p. 20).  
It is a very good example of how the Russian alternative normative world order is 
transferred to the Georgian society through civil society. Which is NATO, and the West in 
general, fighting against the Orthodox Civilization and LGBT groups being associated with 
the West.  
In April of 2014, representatives of the Eurasian Institute visited Moscow and had 
met with the elites of the political scientists of Russia. As it is noted in the report, such 
meetings give an opportunity to Georgian and Russian politicians to communicate and hold 
dialogue with people who can actually influence decision makers in the Kremlin (Eurasian 
Institute, 2014, p. 20).  
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The Eurasian Institute also initiated a project, titled “Public Movement for Russo-
Georgian Dialogue and Cooperation.” As it is claimed in the report, it is an answer from the 
Georgian public to those political powers, which, from inside or outside, have been 
artificially tensing or still tense relations between two nations. Besides the economic 
benefits, as people from Eurasian Institute argue, Georgia and Russia are connected with 
the shared Orthodox faith (Eurasian Institute, 2014, p. 24). 
In addition to these two NGOs, there are several newspapers which are publishing 
articles online or on paper and articulate the same normative discourse. And as it was 
mentioned in the beginning, Gramsci argued that newspapers and publishing houses can be 
considered as one of the key elements in establishing and maintaining hegemony. Due to 
the limitation of the study, it will be impossible to cover all the online or paper-based media 
which transmit this discourse. Therefore, one of them, Saqinform  will be analyzed and it 
will give a general idea of what is the role media can play as a link between the Georgian 
society and the Russian alternative world order. It should also be noted that NGOs which 
were discussed above as well, almost all the media which fall within the Russian discourse, 
are listed as partners on their websites and closely cooperate.  
Saqinform  should be analyzed as an example of how media can transfer the 
Russian discourse to the Georgian society. According to the website, Saqinform was 
restored in 2010 as an informative and analytical agency, based on the agency which in 
1921 was founded as a Caucasus department of the Russian Telegraph Agency. It is only in 
Georgian and Russian, no English version available. And in 2011 activities of the agency 
was blessed by the Patriarch of Georgia. Even quotation of his words is on the top of the 
website, where the head of the GOC calls activities of Saqinform “really national” and says 
that the Church will support as much as possible (Saqinform , 2015).  
Data available from Saqinform is huge and it is impossible to cover everything. 
Therefore only those published articles should be touched which illustrate claims made in 
this study best. On 5th of March, 2012, team of Saqinform congratulated Vladimir Putin 
with being elected as a President of the Russian Federation for the third time. The text itself 
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is full of the same discourse which the Russian political elite, under him, articulates. 
Victory was logical as “the victory of good over evil, ” says the text. It also argues that 
happiness and the blossom of the Russian nation will also mean blossom of the brotherly 
nation of Georgians. “Georgia has last historic chance – to use Putin’s presidency, - the 
only man who can save Georgian people’s history, religion and culture. … Georgian people 
miss followers of the same faith, Russian people, closer anyone we ever had and will ever 
have!”(Saqinform, 2012). 
Another article, which is published on their website, is a public letter from the editor 
in chief to the representative of the Georgian Diaspora in Russia. Editor of the Saqinform 
asks Mikhail Khubutia to pass his program about the popularization of the Russian 
language and Russian language media to Vladimir Putin. The article itself ends with the 
following remark: “In Russia they still haven’t realized that – the knight of light Vladimir 
Putin is sent from God to save Russia and to the whole Orthodox world! And that after 
Stalin, Russia has never had such a leader and, probably, will never have” (Saqinform , 
2014). 
These two examples show how the discourse of current Russian government being 
defender of the Orthodox civilization is transferred to the Georgian society through certain 
media recourses. Battle between good and evil, while Putin is the leader of the “right” 
Orthodox civilization. 
Saqinform  also touches the issue of values and the West is perverted and deviant, 
imposing its value systems in Georgia. Passages from two articles should be mentioned 
below to illustrate this trend. In the article written by editor in chief from 2014 which 
touches the issue of gender equality and women's rights, it says that in the West it has 
become routine that pedophile parents are raping and killing their kids, or politicians, 
despite their higher status, are living in same-sex marriages. It also says that “Western 
Globalists’” main aim is “to destroy every national-Georgian tradition, custom and 
traditional religion – Orthodoxy, the foundation of which is family institute. With husband 
having main role! Only after this Georgia can be considered not as a state, but amorphous 
56 
 
territory inhabited by the local population of undefined sex. … Husbands will be servants 
on NATO military bases, while wives serving bath houses, restaurants, washing houses and 
hotels” (Saqinform, 2014). 
Second example to illustrate this trend, is a public letter to the ambassador of the 
United States to Georgia from the editor in chief on SaqInform published on the website in 
2015. It touches the issue of U.S has imposed standards on the Georgian government it has 
to be abided by. It also includes normative side. As the article argues, United State decided 
to make Georgians “free from God,” to make them equal. But it has also inserted NGOs in 
Georgia, which are telling to the Georgian society that they “shouldn’t be ashamed of their 
sins.” “Even if you are LGBT or a prostitute, be open, transparent and free – be like you 
wish! You are Georgian, therefore – European so incest and same-sex marriages for you are 
normal!” (Saqinform , 2015). 
These passages show how the discourse of the Russian political elite of the West 
being perverted and imposing its stranger for the Orthodox civilization values on other 
countries is transferred through the media. The Georgian Orthodox Church, NGOs and 
certain online or paper-based publishing transmit the alternative world order to the 
Georgian population and therefore forms an important link in supporting and maintaining 











 As it was argued in the present study, since the year 2012, when Vladimir Putin was 
elected as the President of the Russian Federation for the third time, more conservative and 
normative discourse emerged in the Russian political elite, which is supported by the 
Russian Orthodox Church and is projected to the domestic or international audience. The 
discourse of the deviant West versus conservative Russia, which stands as the last bastion 
in defense of traditional value systems, can have a significant effect on the societies in the 
Eastern Partnership countries. As the case of Georgia illustrated in the current study, 
population is torn between two normative discourses, on the one side it has to accept 
reforms in strengthening minority rights and their protection, but on the other hand, stills 
struggles to accept the idea of equal rights for sexual minorities. These contradictions can 
serve as a good basis around which the Russian normative hegemony, defined by the Neo-
Gramscian terms, can penetrate the Georgian society. As Georgians will feel closer to the 
normative discourse coming from the Kremlin rather than from the West, they will be more 
willing to consent to the Russian political elite and as the result turn foreign orienteer from 
the West more to the North. To define it more from the Neo-Gramscian perspective, 
attractiveness of the Russian normative discourse will lead to the Russian hegemony in the 
Georgian society and it will let the Kremlin achieve desired foreign policy results without 
using force or threats.  
 At the same time, as Gramsci argued, institutions of the civil society play a vital 
role in projecting and maintaining hegemony. Due to the August War legacy, the political 
elite in Georgia are more careful about repeating the Russian discourse. As a result, civil 
society institutions become a vital link between the Kremlin’s discourse and the Georgian 
society. The Georgian Orthodox Church, with higher trust among the population, than any 
state institution, and which clearly associates itself with the Russian alternative world order, 
is one of the such institution. Also, several NGOs and media portals, which started 
appearing after the War of 2008. They are closely cooperating in projecting the West versus 
the Orthodox civilization discourse to the Georgian society, the majority of which sees 
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